Europe

More Swedes want to switch currency from the krona to the Euro, with support the highest it's been since 2009, according to a survey by Gothenburg University's SOM Institute.

Paywall? https://archive.is/ZXdUu

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/27083858

The renowned German classical violinist Christian Tetzlaff was blunt in explaining why he and his quartet have cancelled a summer tour of the US.

“There seems to be a quietness or denial about what’s going on,” Tetzlaff said, describing his horror at the authoritarian polices of Donald Trump and the response of US elites to the country’s growing democratic crisis.

“I feel utter anger. I cannot go on with this feeling inside. I cannot just go and play a tour of beautiful concerts.”

Tetzlaff is not alone in acting on his disquiet. A growing international move to boycott the US is spreading from Scandinavia to Canada to the UK and beyond as consumers turn against US goods.

Poland has launched a campaign, titled “We Did It In Poland”, to promote awareness of Polish achievements in science and business, in particular among young Poles. One of the motivations behind the initiative was a recent poll showing 20% of Poles feel ashamed of their country, up from 14% in 2010.

“Pride in their country is felt mainly by representatives of the oldest generation, the so-called baby boomers,” says Olga Kozierowska, head of the Włączeni Plus foundation, which is running the campaign under the patronage of Poland’s current six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union.

“The Gen Zs [those born between around 1997 and 2012], on whom the shaping of Poland’s image in the coming years will depend to the greatest extent, are the most likely of all generations to feel shame,” she added.

In response to the imposition of new, unjustified US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium imports, the Commission has launched swift and proportionate countermeasures on US imports into the EU.

Archive: https://archive.is/2025.03.12-073331/https://www.ft.com/content/21dbc9fa-2503-4a1d-a14c-7ac2b6f44303

Battery maker Northvolt has filed for bankruptcy in Sweden, capping the downfall of a company once regarded as Europe’s best hope of competing in an industry dominated by China.

The Swedish industrial start-up, backed by the likes of Volkswagen, Goldman Sachs and BlackRock, said on Wednesday that it had been unable to secure financing to continue and a court-appointed trustee would now sell off its assets.

“This is an incredibly difficult day for everyone at Northvolt. We set out to build something groundbreaking — to drive real change in the battery, EV and wider European industry and accelerate the transition to a green and sustainable future,” said Tom Johnstone, Northvolt’s interim chair.

It marks an ignominious end to a company that took in about $15bn from investors and governments in a technology crucial for electric vehicles where Europe is playing catch-up to Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This is a developing story

Archive: https://archive.is/2025.03.12-075027/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-12/uk-splits-with-europe-by-avoiding-snap-retaliation-to-us-tariffs

The UK reaffirmed its commitment to US trade talks as British exports were swept up in President Donald Trump’s global steel and aluminum tariffs, breaking with Europe in its decision to retaliate immediately. 

Business and Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds called the US decision to impose 25% levies on foreign metal products without exemptions on Wednesday morning “disappointing.” 

Exchequer secretary to the Treasury James Murray told Times Radio: “We’re not going to retaliate immediately in that way.”

However, he added that Britain would “reserve our right to retaliate” in due course.

The UK government previously said it was reluctant to impose retaliatory tariffs, with officials holding out hope that trade talks announced by Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer last month in Washington would spare the country from the initial salvo.

Archive: https://archive.is/2025.03.12-033948/https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/has-ukraine-called-putins-bluff/

Has Vladimir Putin’s bluff just been called? It certainly looks like it. So long as the Ukrainians were refusing to countenance a ceasefire, then Moscow could portray them as being the obstacle to the kind of quick deal Donald Trump appears eager to conclude. Kyiv had previously floated the idea – after another unhelpful intervention from French President Emmanuel Macron – of a limited ceasefire extending just to long-range drone attacks on each others’ cities and critical infrastructure and operations on the Black Sea. But this was a non-starter that was too transparently a trap for Putin, hoping to make him look like the intransigent party if he turned it down.

Archived

NATO state and member of the Arctic Council, Norway has raised alarm over the steadily rising Chinese presence in the High North, quipping that China’s influence in the region is currently “limited but growing,” as it works more closely with ally Russia, as highlighted by a latest Newsweek report.

It cited the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) annual threat assessment report published in February 2025, which particularly highlights China’s threat and the growing collaboration between China and Russia in the Arctic.

In fact, NIS reports have consistently named these two countries as threats during the last few years. However, the dangers have now become more pronounced.

The 2025 threat assessment states: “China has ambitions to strengthen its presence, capabilities and influence in the Arctic in the coming years. China is facilitating this by strengthening cooperation with Russia on research and commercial activities, as well as by increasing China’s national icebreaker capacity.”

[...]

The Norwegian Intelligence states that China’s investments in Russian liquefied natural gas projects are its “largest and most prominent” Arctic-related activity. However, it also warns that Russia might entice South Africa, India, and Brazil to join its Arctic energy initiatives.

For instance, reports indicate that Russia’s largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is scouring international markets to find buyers for gas from its sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project. It has reportedly set its sights on India, a strategic partner.

The threat assessment report also states that China is focusing on building larger icebreakers and icebreakers with nuclear propulsion, which will improve its capability to map the Arctic for both military and civilian uses. This may not come as a surprise given that last year, China made an unprecedented move by deploying three icebreakers to the Arctic, including its most advanced vessel, Xue Long 2.

For China, the Arctic holds strategic, economic, and environmental significance. Experts warn that the increase in Chinese activity in the region is based on exercising rights related to scientific research, freedom of navigation and overflight, fishery activities, cable and pipeline laying, and resource exploitation in the region. However, they go beyond and often have dual purposes.

In 2023, for instance, China placed acoustic listening buoys in the North Sea and ramped up its research activities in Ny-Ålesund [a small town in Oscar II Land in the west of the island of Spitsbergen].

[...]

The global security landscape has undergone profound changes in recent years, characterized by the rise of revisionist powers and the weakening of the rules-based international order. Two regions stand at the forefront of these challenges: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), confronting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific, where China’s assertive actions continue to raise tensions well beyond the Taiwan Strait.

Despite their geographic distance, CEE and the Indo-Pacific thus face similar economic, political and security challenges, especially when it comes to their authoritarian neighbors. As regional conflicts become increasingly interconnected, the war in Ukraine offers critical lessons not just for Taiwan but for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The Sino-Russian Partnership

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has attempted to position itself as a neutral power promoting peace and stability. However, its actions tell a different story. Beyond the infamous Xi-Putin meeting that established the “no limits” partnership just weeks before Russia’s invasion,** China has effectively sustained Russia’s war efforts through financial collaboration, technology transfers, and the circumvention of international sanctions**. Among these forms of bilateral support, the transfer of dual-use technology and components has been flagged as particularly concerning.

Moreover, Beijing has advanced peace proposals that largely mirror Russian positions while criticizing Western peace initiatives.

[...]

In contrast to Beijing’s ambiguity [...] Japan swiftly provided unconditional support for Ukraine, even at significant costs to its own national interests, including energy cooperation with Moscow.

South Korea initially adopted a more cautious approach, balancing its support for Ukraine against regional security concerns. However, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia’s war efforts in late 2024 prompted Seoul to reassess its position. With Russia and North Korea forming an increasingly entrenched authoritarian alliance, South Korea has drawn closer to Western partners to counter this emerging threat.

[...]

For Central and Eastern European states, particularly those most threatened by Russia’s actions – i.e., Poland, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic – China’s stance on Ukraine has fundamentally altered their approach to Beijing.

[...]

This reflects a broader shift in Central and Eastern Europe, where initial enthusiasm for Chinese investment has largely given way to disillusionment due to unfulfilled economic promises. The cooperation platform between China and CEE (originally known as the 16+1) now functions as a “zombie format,” especially since the withdrawal of the Baltic states. As China’s role in CEE diminishes due to its tacit support for Russia’s aggression and regional cohesion fractures, China has prioritized bilateral relations with countries like Hungary [...]

[...]

CEE states have also embraced more constructive engagement with other Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan [...] Indeed, Taiwan has found vocal allies in the CEE region, with the Czech Senate President Vystrčil’s high-profile visit to Taiwan in 2020 exemplifying these deepening ties. Most recently, Taiwan’s major semiconductor company – TSMC – has begun constructing a semiconductor production facility in Germany, with the Czech Republic and other Visegrád Four (V4) states expected to play vital roles as component suppliers.

[...]

Ukraine and Taiwan share several concerning similarities. Both face revisionist powers that contest their sovereignty based on distorted historical narratives. The long-held neoliberal assumption that economic interdependence deters military aggression has proven flawed in Ukraine and may similarly fail when it comes to Taiwan, where the global economic consequences would be even more severe.

[...]

Source.

While Elon Musk continues to make waves as a disruptive force tearing through U.S. government agencies, his bread-and-butter business appears to be suffering. In response to Musk’s prominent role in the Trump administration, people are protesting outside of Tesla showrooms, getting rid of their Tesla cars or simply not buying them in the first place. Many people no longer want to be associated with Tesla and its divisive CEO, leaving the brand – once a symbol of forward thinking and a progressive lifestyle – reeling.

The latest registration figures published by the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, or ACEA, last week suggest that Europeans are turning their backs on Tesla quickly, as new registrations of Tesla cars plummeted in January against the market trend. According to the figures, Tesla sold less than 10,000 vehicles across the EU plus Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and the United Kingdom, down 45 percent from January 2024. At the same time, new registrations of electric cars surged 37 percent in January, meaning that the Tesla slump cannot be explained by broader market dynamics.

Looking further at 2024 registrations suggests that Tesla has been falling behind in the European market for a while, as its aging fleet is competing with an ever-growing selection of electric vehicles from legacy car makers. Tesla has underperformed the European BEV market in terms of growth in three of the past four quarters, seeing its market share drop from 18.2 percent in 2023 to 16.6 percent in 2024 and just 6 percent in January 2025. How much of that trend is caused by growing competition and the lack of new Tesla models and how much can be attributed to Musk’s increasingly divisive persona is unclear, but the combination of all three factors is not a winning recipe for the former EV frontrunner.

cross-posted from: https://lemm.ee/post/58100982

Volkswagen has said it is willing to consider building equipment for the German military as part of Europe’s efforts to rearm.

Given the rise of the boycott USA movement, the 800 billion € for military that may not be spent but not on US arms and the dominating presence of US tech in the EU, how can citizens voice their concern? @EUCommission@ec.social-network.europa.eu and @EC_OSPO@ec.social-network.europa.eu are on the fediverse, but the just seem like mouth piece without ears.

What can citizens do? Has the ship sailed already?

Some French consumers are looking for ways to do without American products to protest President Donald Trump’s policies on Ukraine. But close trading ties and the nature of multinational companies is making it tough to identify which products to boycott.

European military and political heads are holding high-level talks this week after calls for massively rearming Europe — and boosting aid for Kyiv — amid fears of a less engaged United States. Lisa Bryant has more from Paris.