loudwhisper

Not that I know, which is the reason why I essentially didn't consider those threats relevant for my personal threat model. However, it's also possible it happened and it was never discovered. The point is that there are risks associated with having the same provider having access to both the emails (and the operations around them) and the keys/crypto operations.

The cost of stealthily compromising a secure email company is simply disproportionate compared to the gain from accessing my emails. Likewise, it's unrealistic to think some sophisticated attacker would target me specifically to the point that they will discover and then compromise the specific tooling I am using to access/encrypt/decrypt emails. Also, a $5 wrench could probably achieve the same goal in a quicker and cheaper way.

If I were a Snowden-level person, I would probably consider that though, as it's possible that the US government would try to coerce -say- Proton in serving bad JS code to user X. For most people I argue these are theoretical attacks that do not pose concrete risk.

Thanks, I will go and double check, I am sure there are more typos!

I honestly didn't think at all about the use of checkmarks/crosses and the fact that it can be misinterpreted, I will add a disclaimer.

A bigger issue IMO is how you describe email encryption in transit as a matter of fact, but according to Google transparency report[1] there are still domains that do not support in transit encryption, and, what’s worse, when you send an email you can’t tell if it will be encrypted or not.

you are right. The reason why I took that for granted is because I assumed the scenario in which people use the "mainstream" providers. I was looking at data and I think Outlook and Gmail alone make up more than 50% of the market share. I made an assumption which I considered fair, as 99%+ of the users do not need to worry about this at all. However, this is interesting data and I might add a note about it as well, so thanks!

Thanks!

Can you make the images clickable? They’re impossible to read at that size.

I will look into it, there might be a zola option for it. If there is, sure!

This paragraph should probably mention that this won’t work if the provider uses E2EE

That paragraph is in the context of what I call "transparent encryption", which means E2EE works until the provider is not compromised and the E2EE is effectively broken by delivering malicious software or disclosing the key. E2EE is as resilient as the security of the provider, which is why picking a trusted one is important. Of course, compromising the provider and breaking the E2EE is quite complex.

Thanks a lot! Hopefully at least someone finds it helpful!

Django Unchained

Isn't it ironic that a movie with so many uses of that word helped you understand that word better?

To me it seems a very good reason to believe that people shouldn't be afraid of the syntax of the word, but definitely oppose the use when the semantic is the despicable one.

I think the benefits of federation is discoverability. I can spin up my gitea or forgejo (or something else!) Instance, but when people look for code in their instances, they can still discover my public repositories, and if they want to contribute, they can fork and open PRs from their instances.

So yeah, it means mostly you can selfhost and provide space to others, but with the same benefits that right now github offers (I.e., everything is there).

Oh, it looks like! Something went wrong with Zola build and I must have not noticed. Thanks a lot for pinging me about that, I will fix it today!

EDIT: Fixed! That's what you get when you forget to bump the Docker image version after you upgrade zola version locally with a breaking change in the config! :) Thanks for letting me know, it would have taken me a long time to see it was broken!

Comfort is the main reason, I suppose. If I mess up Wireguard config, even to debug the tunnel I need to go to the KVM console. It also means that if I go to a different place and I have to SSH into the box I can't plug my Yubikey and SSH from there. It's a rare occurrence, but still...

Ultimately I do understand both point of view. The thing is, SSH bots pose no threats after the bare minimum hardening for SSH has been done. The resource consumption is negligible, so it has no real impact.

To me the tradeoff is slight inconvenience vs slightly bigger attack surface (in case of CVEs). Ultimately everyone can decide which compromise is acceptable for them, but I would say that the choice is not really a big one.

Hey, the short answer is yes, you can.

I would elaborate a little more:

• First, you have the problem of sourcing the data. In essence, Crowdsec won't be able to go and fetch those logs for you dynamically, but can go and take those logs from a file (you can do a dirty solution like a sidecar deployment) or from a stream. You can deploy crowdsec in multiple modes, and you can have many instances that talk to each other. You can also simply have some process tailing the pod logs and sending them to a file crowdsec has access to or serving them as a stream (see https://doc.crowdsec.net/docs/data_sources/intro).
• The above means that it doesn't really matter whether you run Crowdsec inside your cluster (it does have a Helm chart) or on the host. Ultimately all it matters is that crowdsec has access to your pods logs (for example, the logs of your ingress controller).
• The next piece is the remediation component. What do you want crowdsec to do, once it is able to detect bad IPs? If you want to just add IPs to the firewall, then it might make more sense running it on the host(s) you use in ingress, if you want to add the IPs to network policies you can do it, but you need to develop your own remediation components. I am planning to write a remediation component that will add the IPs to Hetzner firewall, some other systems are already supported, but this would be a way to basically block the IPs outside your cluster. For nginx ingress controller there is already a pre-made remediation component .

In practice I personally would choose a simple setup where the interesting logs are just forwarded (in Syslog format for example) to a single crowdsec instance. If you have ingress from a single node, I'd go for running it on the host and banning via firewall, if you have multiple ingress nodes, then I would run it inside the cluster and ban via a loadBalancer/cloud firewall/whatever you have in front.

In essence, I would spend some time to think about your preferences, and it might take a little bit to make the setup clean, but I think you have plenty of flexibility to do what you prefer. Let me know if you want to bounce some more ideas!

Yeah I know (I mentioned it myself in the post), but realistically there is no much you can do besides upgrading. Unattended upgrades kick in once a day and you will install the security patches ASAP. There are also virtual patches (crowdsec has a virtual patch for that CVE), but they might not be very effective.

I argue that VPN software is a smaller attack surface, but the problem still exists (CVEs) for everything you expose.

Nice! I didn't know this. Thanks!

AFAIK I know that SSH has MaxAuthTries and LoginGraceTime, but all it does is terminating the SSH session (I.e. slow down at most), it won't block the IP via firewall or configuration.

Not sure if there is a recent feature that does the same.