Saki

“It is completely absurd to inflict mass surveillance on the general public under the premise of fighting theft.”

It comes at a cost to the privacy and civil liberties of the people of Britain.

The right time to start protecting your digital privacy is before your trip […] The simplest and most reliable precaution against border searches is to reduce the amount of information that you carry across the border.

Sometimes law enforcement officials achieve so-called “consent” by being vague […] You can try to dispel this ambiguity by inquiring whether border agents are asking you or ordering you […] If an agent says it is a request only, you might politely but firmly decline to comply with the request.

If you are a U.S. citizen, border agents cannot stop you from entering the country, even if you refuse to unlock your device, provide your device password, or disclose your social media information. However, agents may escalate the encounter if you refuse.

If you elect to comply with a border agent’s order to unlock your device, provide your password, or disclose your social media information, you can inform the agent that you are complying under protest and that you do not consent.

It is possible that if you unlock your device, and agents then search your device, a court will rule that you consented to the search. […] As noted in Part 1, the best way to avoid an inadvertent “consent” to search is to decline to unlock your device, provide the device password, or provide any social media information.

Technically, you don’t even need to admit that you know the password.

If you believe that border agents violated your digital rights at the border, please contact EFF at borders@eff.org.

See also:

• https://www.eff.org/document/eff-border-search-pocket-guide
• https://www.eff.org/issues/border-searches
• https://monero.town/post/402125 Fifth Circuit says law enforcement doesn’t need warrants to search phones at the border

The fact that the issue was discovered by Google TAG suggests it was exploited by a nation-state actor or by a surveillance firm.

As usual, Google did not publish details about the attacks exploiting the flaw in the wild.

See also: https://www.cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2023-100/

This vulnerability also affects Chromium-based web browser such as Microsoft Edge [3], Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi.

“Some Hackers have figured out there is no quick and easy way for a company that receives one of these EDRs (emergency data request) to know whether it is legitimate,” he said.

“The hackers will send a fake emergency data request along with an attestation that innocent people will likely suffer greatly or die unless the requested data is provided immediately.”

privacy has nothing to do with having something to hide. Instead, privacy means protecting the human being that you are, all the personal details that make you, you. What you care about, what you love, what you hate, what you are curious about, what makes you laugh, what you fear. And most importantly, choosing when you decide to share that information and who you share it with.

it is possible to build technology used by millions of people with privacy at the heart. We build technology to advance that right in order to help users reclaim their agency in digital spaces.

(But by default, Tor Browser is not shipped with uBlock Origin.)

PS: ONION LINK http://pzhdfe7jraknpj2qgu5cz2u3i4deuyfwmonvzu5i3nyw4t4bmg7o5pad.onion/tor-in-2023/index.html

NOTE: This is about the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination after a search warrant for someone’s cell phone is procured; not about digital privacy in general at the U.S. Border (a warrantless search).

See also: https://monero.town/post/1134494 EFF to Supreme Court: Fifth Amendment Protects People from Being Forced to Enter or Hand Over Cell Phone Passcodes to the Police

Now before the House, HR 6570 proposes to reauthorize Section 702 for three years — but with reforms including requiring all US intelligence agencies to obtain a warrant before conducting a US person query.

a competing bill, the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023 (HR 6611), doesn't include a warrant requirement — and, in fact, includes language that many worry could be used to force private US companies into assisting in government-directed surveillance

House Intelligence Committee bill would also expand the definition of an electronic communication service provider include a broader range of providers, including those who “provide hardware through which people communicate on the Internet.”

See also: Tell Congress: They Must Defeat HPSCI’s Horrific Surveillance Bill | EFF Action Center

How FinCEN May Be Violating Your Rights
A call to action against FINCEN proposal 2023-0016A
Written By Preston Pysh

Eroding Anonymity Through Additional Verification: The mandate for “Additional Customer Identity Verification Measures for Transactions Involving Unhosted Wallets” is a direct affront to privacy and anonymity. This requirement transgresses on the First Amendment’s sanctuary for anonymous speech

A Direct Assault on Anonymity-Enhanced Currencies: The “Prohibition on the Use of Anonymity-Enhanced Convertible Virtual Currencies (AECVC)” is nothing short of a legislative bulldozer through the edifice of privacy.

See also: Preston Pysh says proposed FinCEN crypto rules violate US Constitution

Bis zum Jahr 2030 will die EU allen Bürger:innen eine „European Digital Identity Wallet“ (ID-Wallet) zur Verfügung stellen. Sie soll on- wie offline bei Verwaltungsgängen und Bankgeschäften, aber auch bei Arztbesuchen, Alterskontrollen oder beim Internetshopping zum Einsatz kommen.

(By 2030, the EU wants to provide all citizens with a “European Digital Identity Wallet” (ID wallet). It is intended to be used online and offline for administrative procedures and banking as well as medical visits, age verification, and internet shopping.)

The article (in German) is mostly about eIDAS 45
Cf. https://monero.town/post/1018961 Last Chance to fix eIDAS: Secret EU law threatens Internet security

(There are many English articles about it; see e.g.
https://mullvad.net/en/blog/eu-digital-identity-framework-eidas-another-kind-of-chat-control )

Though not the main topic of the article, this “ID wallet” thing sounds disturbing. (EU politicians calls a normal wallet “unhosted wallet” and don’t like it very much.)

Many countries use censorship systems to block access to human rights resources

.onion sites are particularly useful at maximizing internet users' privacy and anonymity because they never leave the Tor network.

While technically I2P might be better, it’s good news that a recognized human rights organization has adopted an onion, because that will improve the “shady” image of Tor, esp. hidden services (aka darknet), as in “privacy technology is good, not for criminals, but for you, for everyone. Using Tor is normal, and Monero is a great tool.”

law enforcement has been using […] systems since 2015, in utmost secrecy. The software in question […] can track a person across a network of cameras, for instance, by the color of their sweater

Any policeman […] can request to use [it]

The potential use of facial recognition worries within the institution itself. […] In France, facial recognition is only authorized in rare exceptions

This massive installation was carried out outside the legal framework provided by a European directive and the French Data Protection Act

The National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL), a French administrative regulatory body, started an investigation against the French Minister of the Interior [1][2]. The Minister, Gérald Darmanin ordered an investigation [2].

• [1] https://nitter.oksocial.net/CNIL/status/1724745047537488019 [French]
• [2] https://web.archive.org/web/20231121093507/https://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/gerald-darmanin/entretien-gerald-darmanin-lantisemitisme-le-signe-dune-societe-qui-ne-va-pas-tres-bien-938b76ce-856c-11ee-9632-b62f00689e79 [French]

La Cnil […] annonce l’ouverture d’une enquête contre le ministère de l’Intérieur. Elle soupçonne la police d’utiliser un logiciel de reconnaissance faciale, depuis 2015, en dehors de tout cadre légal. Qu’en est-il ?

(CNIL suspects the police are using facial recognition outside any legal framework. Comments? - Gérald Darmanin’s answer: The news is true. I ordered an investigation.)